Abstract. Assume-guarantee reasoning has long been advertised as an important method for decomposing proof obligations in system verification. Refinement mappings (homomorphisms) have long been advertised as an important method for solving the languageinclusion problem in practice. When confronted with large verification problems, we therefore attempted to make use of both techniques. We soon found that rather than offering instant solutions, the success of assume-guarantee reasoning depends critically on the construction of suitable abstraction modules, and the success of refinement checking depends critically on the construction of suitable witness modules. Moreover, as abstractions need to be witnessed, and witnesses abstracted, the process must be iterated. We present here the main lessons we learned from our experiments, in form of a systematic and structured discipline for the compositional verification of reactive modules. An infrastructure to support this discipline, and automate parts of the verification, has been implemented in the tool MOCHA.
Introduction
Formal verification is a systematic approach for detecting logical errors in designs. The designer uses a language with mathematical semantics to describe the design, which is then analyzed for correctness with respect to a specification. We refer to the design being analyzed as the implementation. The verification problem is called refinement checking when the specification is a more abstract design. For a trace semantics, the refinement-checking problem is PSPACEhard in the size of the implementation description and in the state space of the specification. Not surprisingly, algorithms for refinement checking are exponential in the size of the implementation description and doubly exponential in the size of the specification description.
There are two general classes of techniques for combating this state-explosion problem. Type-1 techniques focus on improving algorithms, often developing heuristics that target specific application domains, such as symbolic methods for synchronous hardware designs, and partialorder methods for asynchronous communication protocols. Type-2 techniques focus on dividing the verification task at hand into simpler tasks, often making use of the compositional structure of both implementation and specification, such as assume-guarantee methods for proof decomposition. While type-1 techniques can be applied fully automatically and improve the efficiency of formal verification, they need to be complemented by type-2 techniques in order to make the approach fully scalable. Type-2 techniques, however, require substantial assistance from human verification experts, and their systematic application in nontrivial situations remains somewhat of a black art.
We are developing a formal-verification tool, called MOCHA [AHM + 98], which is based on the system description language of reactive modules [AH96] . Reactive modules permit the modular and hierarchical description of heterogeneous systems, and have been designed explicitly to support type-2 techniques such as assume-guarantee reasoning. In this paper, we present the experiences and results of our attempts to make use of type-2 techniques within MOCHA in a disciplined and systematic way. We report on a methodology that has led us to success in verifying a hardware circuit that implements Tomasulo's algorithm, and a sliding-window communication protocol. Since the description of these examples would require more space than is available in these proceedings, we illustrate our methodology, instead, on a circuit that implements a simple three-stage pipeline.
We now briefly outline our methodology, which approaches a refinement-checking problem of the form P 1 kP 2 Q (where is the trace-containment relation) by introducing abstraction and witness modules. Suppose that the state space of the implementation P 1 kP 2 is too large to be handled by exhaustive search algorithms. A naive compositional approach would attempt to prove both P 1 Q and P 2 Q, and then conclude P 1 kP 2 Q. Though sound, the naive approach often fails in practice, because P 1 usually refines Q only in a suitable constraining environment, and so does P 2 . Hence we construct a suitable constraining environment A 2 for P 1 , and similarly A 1 for P 2 . Since A 1 describes the aspects of P 1 that are relevant to constraining P 2 , and similarly A 2 is an abstract description of P 2 , the two new modules A 1 and A 2 are called abstraction modules. By assume-guarantee reasoning, we conclude P 1 kP 2 Q from the two proof obligations P 1 kA 2 A 1 kQ and A 1 kP 2 QkA 2 .
Traditionally, the size of the implementation has been viewed as the main source of complexity for the refinement-checking problem. In our approach, we shift the focus to the size of the gap between the implementation and the specification. As an extreme case, if we are given two identical copies of a design, we ought to be able to verify that one is a valid refinement of the other, no matter how large the designs. We want the success rate of our methodology to increase if the designer invests effort in structuring the implementation and specification so as to expose more commonality between them. Abstraction modules form an intermediate layer between the implementation and the specification, and thus provide a systematic way of reducing the gap. In our case studies, we found that abstraction modules generally take the form of abstract definitions for hidden implementation variables. When composed with the original specification, which often specifies only relationships between primary inputs and outputs, the abstraction modules yield a richer specification that is closer to the implementation. Constructing good abstraction modules requires manual effort. Once constructed, our methodology automatically makes effective use of the abstraction modules to decompose the refinement check.
Even if the state space of the implementation becomes manageable as a result of proof decomposition, each remaining refinement check, say P 0 = P 1 kA 2 A 1 kQ = Q 0 , is still PSPACEhard in the size of the specification state space. However, for the special case that all variables of Q 0 are also present in P 0 (in this case, we say that Q 0 is projection refinable by P 0 ), the refinement check reduces to a transition-invariant check, which verifies that every move of P 0 can be mimicked by Q 0 . The complexity of this procedure is linear on the state spaces of both P 0 and Q 0 . If Q 0 is not projection refinable by P 0 , our methodology advocates the introduction of a witness module W, which makes explicit how the hidden variables of the specification Q 0 depend on the state of the implementation P 0 . Then Q 0 is projection refinable by P 0 kW, and it suffices to prove P 0 kW Q 0 in order to conclude P 0 Q 0 . The construction of witness modules also requires manual effort, but whenever the specification Q 0 simulates the implementation P 0 , a suitable witness can be found.
Related work. The individual pieces of our methodology are not new; we simply advocate their disciplined use within the framework of reactive modules. In particular, assume-guarantee rules for various formalisms can be found in [Sta85, CLM89, GL94, AL95, McM97] ; the rule used in this paper has been taken from [AH96] . Witnesses In order to avoid inconsistent specifications, the await dependencies must be acyclic. In reactive modules, the acyclicity restriction is enforced statically, by partitioning the controlled variables into atoms that can be ordered such that in each round, the initial (or new) values for all variables of an atom can be determined simultaneously from the initial (or new) values of the external variables and the variables of earlier atoms.
Each round, therefore, consists of several subrounds-one for the external variables, and one per atom. Each atom has an initial command, which specifies the possible initial values for the variables of the atom, and an update command, which specifies the possible new values for the variables of the atom within each update round. In the update command, unprimed occurrences of variables refer to the latched values from the previous round; in both the initial and update commands, primed occurrences of variables refer to the initial (or new) values from the same round.
Example 1. Consider the simple instruction set architecture defined by the reactive module ISA of Figure 1 . The module ISA has five external variables (inputs)-the operation op, the immediate operand inp, the source registers src1 and src2, and the destination register dest. There are two interface variables (outputs)-the value out of a STORE instruction, and a boolean variable stall, which indicates if the current inputs have been accepted. If the value of stall is true in a round, then no instruction is processed in that round, and the environment is supposed to produce the same instruction again in the next round. Finally, there is one private variable-the register file isaRegFile.
A round of the module ISA consists of four subrounds. In the first subround of each update round, the environment chooses an operation, operands, and a destination, by assigning values to the external variables. In the second subround, the atom ISAStall decides nondeterministically if the current inputs are processed, by setting stall to true or false. updated value of stall is false and the current operation is STORE, then out is updated to the contents of the destination register from the previous round. Since both atoms ISARegFile and ISAOut wait, in each update round, for the new value of stall, they must be executed after the atom ISAStall, which produces the new value of stall. However, there are no await dependencies between the atoms ISARegFile and ISAOut, and therefore the third and fourth subrounds of each update round can be interchanged.
u t
Parallel composition. The composition operation combines two reactive modules into a single module whose behavior captures the interaction between the two component modules. Two modules P and Q are compatible if (1) the controlled variables of P and Q are disjoint, and (2) the await dependencies between the variables of P and Q are acyclic. If P and Q are two compatible modules, then the composition PkQ is the module whose atoms are the (disjoint) union of the atoms from P and Q. The interface variables of PkQ are the (disjoint) union of the interface variables of P and Q, and the private variables of PkQ are the (disjoint) union of the private variables of P and Q. The external variables of PkQ consist of the external variables of P that are not interface variables of Q, and the external variables of Q that are not interface variables of P. Furthermore, it can be shown that if P does not have any private variables, and P is simulated by Q, then a witness to the refinement P Q does exist. In summary, the creativity required from the human verification expert is the construction of a suitable witness module, which makes explicit how the private state of the specification Q depends on the state of the implementation P.
Assume-guarantee reasoning. The state space of a module may be exponential in the size of the module description. Consequently, even checking projection refinement may not be feasible. However, typically both the implementation P and the specification Q consist of the parallel composition of several modules, in which case it may be possible to reduce the problem of checking if P Q to several subproblems that involve smaller state spaces. The assume-guarantee rule for reactive modules [AH96] allows us to conclude P Q as long as each component of the specification Q is refined by the corresponding components of the implementation P within a suitable environment. The following proposition gives a slightly generalized account of the assume-guarantee rule. We make use of this proposition as follows. First we decompose the specification Q into its components Q 1 k kQ n . Then we find for each component Q i of the specification a suitable module ? i (called an obligation module) and check that ? i Q i . This is beneficial if the state space of ? i is smaller than the state space of P. The module ? i is the parallel composition of two kinds of modules-essential modules and constraining modules. The essential modules are chosen from the implementation P so that every interface variable of Q i is an interface variable of some essential module. There may, however, be some external variables of Q i that are not observable for the essential modules. In this case, to ensure that Q i is refinable by ? i , we need to choose constraining modules from either from the implementation P or from the specification Q (other than Q i ). Once Q i is refinable by ? i , if the refinement check ? i Q i goes through, then we are done. Typically, however, the external variables of ? i need to be constrained in order for the refinement check to go through. Until this is achieved, we must add further constraining modules to ? i .
It is preferable to choose constraining modules from the specification, which is less detailed than the implementation and therefore gives rise to smaller state spaces (in the undesirable limit, if we choose ? i = P, then the proof obligation ? i Q i involves the state space of P and is no simpler than the original proof obligation P Q). Unfortunately, due to lack of detail, the specification often does not supply a suitable choice of constraining modules. According to the following simple property of the refinement relation, however, we can arbitrarily "enrich" the specification by composing it with new modules.
Proposition 4. [Abstraction modules]
For all modules P, Q, and A, if P QkA and Q is refinable by P, then P Q.
So, before applying the assume-guarantee rule, we may add modules to the specification and prove P QkA 1 k kA k instead of P Q. The new modules A 1 ; : : : ; A k are called abstraction modules, as they usually give high-level descriptions for some implementation components, in order to provide a sufficient supply of constraining modules. In summary, the creativity required from the human verification expert is the construction of suitable abstraction modules, which on one hand, need to be as detailed as required to serve as constraining modules in assumeguarantee reasoning, and on the other hand, should be as abstract as possible to minimize their state spaces.
While witness modules are introduced "on the left" of a refinement relation, abstraction modules are introduced "on the right." So it may be necessary to iterate both processes, providing witnesses for abstractions, and abstractions for witnesses. An example of this will appear in the next section. fails trivially, because ISAOut is not refinable by PipeOut. The module ISAOut has an external variable isaRegFile that is not present in PipeOut. To achieve refinability, we add ISARegFile, the module controlling isaRegFile, to ? 1 and try to prove ?1 = ISARegFilekPipeOut Q1 = ISAOut:
This fails because the input regFile to PipeOut is not constrained. We add RegFile to constrain regFile, but in vain, because the check ?1 = ISARegFilekRegFilekPipeOut Q1 = ISAOut also fails. The reason now is that the inputs to RegFile are not constrained. We add Pipe2 for this purpose, and then Pipe1 , Opr1, Opr2, and Stall to constrain the inputs to Pipe2 . At last, we are able to prove the proof obligation
Now, according to Proposition 3, the assume-guarantee proof looks as follows:
ISARegFilekRegFilekPipe1kPipe2k
Opr1kOpr2kStallkPipeOut ISAOut  ISARegFile ISARegFile  Stall ISAStall  ISARegFilekRegFilekPipe1kPipe2k Opr1kOpr2kStallkPipeOut ISAOutkISARegFilekISAStall
However, notice that the biggest module on the left side above the line is exactly the same as the module on the left side below the line. Hence, the compositional approach did not yield much advantage.
So let us return to the PIPELINE module with the intent of adding abstraction modules. We will add three abstraction modules-AbsOpr1 , AbsOpr2, and AbsRegFile, corresponding to Opr1, Opr2, and RegFile. Notice that whenever the required operand specified by src1 is currently being produced by ALU or is in wbReg, module Opr1 looks ahead and finds it. Otherwise, it gets the operand from the register file in PIPELINE. It is observed that the specification variable isaRegFile src1 0 ] contains the same value that will be produced by the forwarding logic. This observation can be used to write the following abstraction module for Opr1. 
Discussion
In the previous section, we presented an assume-guarantee proof of the fact that PIPELINE refines ISA. In this section, we would like to touch upon some of the issues and finer points that came up while we were developing this methodology.
Projection refinability. Our definition of projection refinability is stronger than necessary. A variable is history-free if no atom uses the (latched) value of the variable from the previous round.
Otherwise, the variable is said to be a latch variable. For module Q to be projection refinable by module P, it is sufficient to require that every latch variable of Q is observable in both P and Q.
Trivial witnesses. An atom is deterministic if two distinct guards of the initial command cannot be true in any given round, and the same is true for the update command. A module is deterministic if all its atoms are deterministic. If a private variable of the specification is controlled by a deterministic module, and all variables on which it depends are already present in the implementation, then the witness module for this variable can be easily constructed by copying the initial and update commands of the controlling module. This phenomenon can be noticed in the case study of Section 4, where we claimed ISARegFile as the witness for the variable isaRegFile. Notice also that this simplicity comes at a price. The module ISARegFile has latch variables, and so we have increased the number of state bits in the module over which we perform the transition-invariant check. Alternatively, a more complex witness for isaRegFile, which does not have any latch variables, can be produced [HQR98] .
Choice of constraining modules. An important problem one faces in a compositional proof is the choice of a mimimal set of constraining modules, preferably with small state spaces. Consider one proof obligation ("lemma") ? i Q i in the compositional proof of P Q using Proposition 3. Starting from the essential modules, our implementation chooses progressively larger obligation modules ? i in two steps. First, sufficient constraining modules are added to make Q i refinable by ? i . Second, additional constraining modules are chosen according to a heuristics that looks at the data dependencies in the specification and implementation, until ? i refines Q i . The constraining modules are chosen preferably from the specification Q, rather than from the implementation P. Alternatively, the user can force specific submodules of P or Q into ? i .
Fairness.
Though not discussed here, our methodology also supports fairness conditions on the specification and implementation [HQR98] . Other case studies. We used the methodology outlined in Section 3 to verify implementations of a sliding-window protocol and of Tomasulo's algorithm. Space does not permit us to describe these case studies in detail; a detailed description can be found in [HQR98] . The results of our experiments are summarized in Table 1 . The table on the left gives the results for the slidingwindow protocol with window size 12. The table on the right gives the results for Tomasulo's algorithm with 4 registers and 4 reservation stations. The tables enumerate the lemmas that were proved to conclude that the implementation refines the specification. There is a lemma for each component of the specification, and a lemma for each abstraction module that is composed with the specification. The second column gives the number of boolean latch variables that encode the state space of the corresponding obligation module. In all proofs, most obligation modules contained components from the specification or abstraction modules. These components are typically very abstract, with much nondeterminism and small state spaces. The row labeled "monolithic" refers to a noncompositional proof, where the transition-invariant check is performed on the full state space of the implementation. The superscript indicates an unsuccessful verification attempt.
